What does it mean to mediate in the contemporary world? During the Cold War and since various forms of international intervention maintained a fragile strategic and territorially sovereign balance between states and their elite leaders, or built new states and inculcated new norms. In the post-Cold War era intervention and mediation shifted beyond the balance of power and towards the liberal peace, as in Bosnia Herzegovina. In the case of Northern Ireland, identity, territorial sovereignty, and the nature of governance also began to be mediated, leading to more complex, post-liberal formulations. This article offers and evaluates a genealogy of the evolution of international mediation.
Introduction
During the Cold War, and since, international mediation has become a well-recognised tool of conflict management and diplomacy, used by the US, the UN, a range of INGO and private 1 Thanks to several anonymous reviewers who put a great deal of effort into helping me clarify my argument, as well as to audience members at several workshops and conferences including a presentation at the Global South Unit for Mediation, PUC, Rio de Janeiro, July 2016, and the University of Tromso, 23 January, 2015. Any errors remain mine alone. determined how priorities are organised, however. In genealogical terms this led to systemmaintenance, in which the struggle for rights and recognition could only occur within an analogue (territorial, institutional, and sovereign) framework of national self-determination, where no significant superpower concerns were raised (Pierson 2002 : Kissinger 1994 .
In Cyprus and in the absence of any powerful interests or associated mediators (as with US President Carter at Camp David), the UN Secretary General and his representatives initially tried to design a peace treaty, using the security and political space provided by the presence of a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). From its beginning in 1964 this process did not meet with the satisfaction of the then dominant Greek Cypriot side which felt it repeated the mistakes of the 1960 constitution in favouring the minority, Turkish Cypriot side. The Greek Cypriot side argued that the norm of national self-determination for the majority meant they should not have to make concessions to the minority, even at the behest of a moral authority such as the UN Secretary General. This strategy backfired when in 1974 right-wing extremists launch a coup in Cyprus in favour of even more nationalist positions.
This provided Turkish forces with a reason to act to create a new status more in their territorial, if not political or legal, favour (Birand 1985:1-11 ).
Subsequently, the UN mediation process simply adapted to the new geopolitical power structures (despite calls for justice), grounding the legitimacy of peace on the potential, if reluctant, consent of all sides' governments. This created a dynamic where for political reasons both side preferred continuing talks (and escaping blame for failure) to making concessions, which has held ever since. Mediation was mainly involved in maintaining the talks though preliminary part-agreements were signed in 1977 and 1977. Sophisticated mediation tools were used to arrive at these positions, including 'shuttle mediation' to overcome the two sides unequal legal status, and the production of non-binding 'non-papers' to avoid inadvertent recognition of the north. Such elite level tactics blocked compromise and filtered widely across both societies (Constantinou & Papadakis 2001) .
Mediation effectively maintained the status quo, satisfying the 'devious objectives' of the disputants to preserve their current positions and give little away (===), though discussions have inched forward over five decades. At times both parties have run the risk of being identified as spoilers in their attempt to manipulate the peace process, and have spent much of their negotiating energies on avoiding making compromises or taking blame (Doyle 2011:261) . As the debate has been framed by territoriality, sovereignty, and conservative understandings of international law, little progress has been possible, especially as the mediator has little practical leverage.
Under the conditions of potential EU accession, and a framework which would both be more liberalised and less territorialised, as well as the collapse in the legitimacy of ethnic identity as an ordering system, the early 2000s looked more promising. UN mediation now led to a draft agreement, because benefits had increased for both sides, including the Turkish side, in the guise of EU integration. Militarism, ethno-nationalism and majoritarianism now appeared to be retrograde (The Annan Plan 2004) . A concerted nationalist campaign blocked the Annan Plan however, leaving UN and EU personnel furious (Hannay 2004 :37-54: Palley 2005 . International mediation, its assumptions of give and take according to an incentive structure within the framework of a now revised form of territorial statehood, appeared to be flawed.
Similar dynamics can be gleaned from other stage 1 type cases from this era. Power and territoriality were contested by leaders in the case of mediation between Israel and Egypt (Princen 1992). Elite level power mediation, as practiced by President Carter, could only bring about a solution by removing key issues from the table (in this case the Palestinian situation). His mediation did not judge the nature of the involved states' regimes, but exercised power and diplomatic ambiguity, carving up the issues into what could be solved quickly and what had to be left out, regardless of injustice. In this case (as in Cyprus), the wider public was rarely consulted. This allowed elites to continue to avoid certain issues, leading to unresolved and potentially conflict inducing problems for the future (Wright 2014:243) .
The usual approaches of constructive ambiguity in the agreement actually preserved the status of the negotiating teams through allowing them to claim success, albeit at the expense of a positive peace. Mediation focussed on offering substantial incentives and state defined security interests between disputants, who regularly threatened to end the process, implying a return to war. In neither of these cases were disputants able to think or act outside of state security frameworks, and thus they were not able to deal with identity or rights issues in a way commensurate with basic notions of human rights or social perceptions of what might be just. Indeed, the danger was that an agreement might provide incentives for further violence (Keen 2012:31) . Justice was diluted by claiming success whilst preserving power and status.
Stage 1 type agreements, even if backed by force and lacking justice, may achieve legitimacy within the states-system, however, as was the case between Israel and Egypt in 1979. Mediation through the role of a powerful or status wielding (normally male), representative of the state was aimed at mitigating the clash of interests between power bases, resulting in a trading of concessions in return for international incentives, which maintains the states-system and minimises direct violence. It is thus inherently conservative. It involves accepting structural violence: badly drawn boundaries, sometimes war crimes, movements of populations, refugees, damage to property, and so on, in the interests of a removal of the threat of violence for a security community or the international community, removing any conceptual threat for the latter. Its heritage is of mainly European, elite diplomacy (Constantinou & DerDerien, 2010 : Constantinou 2004 , the Westphalian system of sovereignty, and an elite-led, military and rational-legal discourse. Stage 1 mediation adopted problem-solving approaches to maintain territorial, material, ideological, normative and hierarchical aspects of the current order.
Civilian populations were generally seen as relatively passive audiences to attempts to replace violence with discursive institutional processes, ceasefires, and mutual recognition, which led to formal agreements. However, most peace processes, from Camp David to the Oslo process, were ultimately been blocked by the very issues they tried to resolve. Indeed, the very frameworks used to make progress have often also become new points of contention (Wright 2014:243) . The fate of the Oslo process might be indicative for current talks in Syria, led to ever increasingly sophisticated systems of territorial control. In Cyprus the role of the UN and EU has failed to transcend territorial-nationalism (but may now be on the brink of doing so). In the related literatures there were frequent discussions of 'ripe moments', 'hurting stalemates', power, neutrality and impartiality. The eventual conclusions of these debates suggested that mediators needed to understand the language and praxis of diplomacy, and if success was to be achieved, access to some of the power that states controlled (Newman et al. 2006) . Success was thus defined as either a basic and agreed security order (a cease-fire or a new border), and possibly to contribute to a more sophisticated framework (eg constitutional change) (Kleiboer 1996:376) . In many cases, as with the TRNC, Palestine, Kashmir, or Western Sahara, the existing state and self-determination system has not been able to resolve secessionist political claims in the medium of long-term. Awkward status-quos have emerged in such situations, though in some (as in Kashmir) violence has resumed or the agreement did not stick, even in a rudimentary manner.
In maintaining the existing state-system stage 1 mediation pointed to systemic failure in its analogue form. Despite its claims of pragmatism through limited goals, stage 1 outcomes have been determined by historical and state-centric power relations rather than diplomacy or norms. It has sustained the logical of territoriality and the rationalities associated with both social and international hierarchies of groups and states. Ceasefires often broke down, as in the Middle East after the 1967 war, or peacekeeping forces were drawn into local and regional conflicts as in Congo after 1960. Mediation processes often stumbled on, making only incremental gains, as in Cyprus after 1964. Talks for the sake of talks, avoiding blame, non-papers, back-sliding, and maintaining the integrity of the states-system, all tended to take priority over the assumption of a compromise agreement (Kleiboer 1996) . This rationality of mediation concluded that mediators with power were more effective, and implicitly became an apologia for the excesses of power over justice (Princen 1992) . Only a few theoretical contributions offered problematized versions of this debate: occasionally the role of culture in communication was raised (Cohen 1996:107) and on rare occasions, alternative rationalities were offered (Constantinou, 2004) .
Stage 2: Liberal Approaches to International Mediation
Debates about unofficial forms of mediation, the diversity of power, the limits of consent or neutrality, and the role of civil society and NGOs soon began to emerge in response to the problems inherent in stage 1 approaches (Dixon 1996 : Fisher, 2006 . After the Cold War mediation began to be connected with the liberal peace and its normative political and economic framework within the confines of the existing states-system (Paris 2004):
foregrounding democracy, human rights and free trade. Mediation began to be seen more broadly as a way of settling, resolving, or pacifying differences through diplomacy, law, institutional reform, and thus state and regional design. A peace process would incorporate power sharing, consociational arrangements between elites, as well as negotiations over international borders and the redistribution of territory (O'Leary 2005). Such development is exemplified by debates on regional integration in the EU as a normative process, or statebuilding debates on how best to build a better polity (Manners 2008; Paris et al. 2009 ).
The pros and cons of liberal peace approaches to mediation have been the topic of some debate since the 1990s when the use of UN mediation in particular began to significantly increase (Convergne, 2016: 137) and a related epistemic community began to emerge (ibid: 144). This meant peace processes would require significant structural and normative changes in conflict-affected societies, following 'best-practice' in western post-war states. In genealogical terms, this is where the civilising mission of colonial states was translated into modernisation, development, democratisation and rights: trusteeship gave way to assimilation into the liberal international architecture. State fragility as well as state power were now more clearly understood, and informal and non-state actors were increasingly prominent. Civil society was now an important part of a viable peace system, crystallised by basic human rights norms. Civil society, NGOs, informal actors, as well as more traditional mediators began to form teams working for a common goal (Garrigues, 2015) . Even in cases where mediation continues sporadically, as in Cyprus, Syria or in South Sudan recently, international support is lacking and such roles are easily brushed off or ignored, due to the wide variety of actors and limited clarity in terms of who holds legitimate political authority (Garrigues, 2015: 3) . At one level this indicates a lack of international consensus and political will, a lack of resources, a lack of weight attributed to discourses of compromise and cooperation: at another it indicates that many conflicts operate outside of the limits of the states-system or liberal international architecture.
Some of this may be attributed to the War on Terror and the invasion of Iraq and
Afghanistan, which has partially discredited the West and its institutions, as well as failures in Uncertainty about the nature of conflict in today's world as well as the unsuitability of existing tools has led to a search for new thinking (Convergne 2016: 136 & 152) . In the next section I discuss the emergence of a third framework as a response.
Stage 3 Post-Liberal Mediation
A response to the genealogical critique of both forms of mediation is now required, one that This indicates further requirements for new forms of mediation. In a more digital and fluid framework, mediation has to be able to operate across mobile and networked platforms of agency and authority, with a view not merely to maintaining the states-system or inculcating liberal norms, but with a view to enabling global justice. A progressive rearrangement of material resources within and across all types of state and societies would inevitably become part of mediation, the solutions it produces and the political arrangements that emanate from such settlements. It would require the extension of concepts like human security, structural inequality, distributive and historical injustice, the limitations of sovereignty, the global commons, post-colonial politics, the pros and cons of political liberalism, and intervention. Its rationality and logic would have to be driven by local, everyday issues, and agency, to a significant degree, meaning an engagement with contextual knowledge and systems, the use of co-mediation incorporating local social movements, peace committees, and other scalar and transversal movements (Accord, 2015: 14) . These broad processes then need to be refined into networked, mobile, transversal and trans-scalar forms of social legitimacy, then legitimate authority (probably at the 'state' level), and reformed regional and international architecture: global governance and capital would be tools for global justice.
Thus, mediation could be developed in the context of three relatively recent issues:
(i) the need for pluralism across widely divergent normative and identity frameworks;
(ii) the need for development and growing equality across different temporal, geographic and material positionalities (distributive, historical, and global justice);
(iii) and the need for long-term environmental sustainability within a critical human security framework underpinned by networked agency and mobile subjects.
Thus post-liberal mediation would mediate difference through inter-subjectivity, widely varying positionalities, as well as work towards environmental and social sustainability, through and beyond the state (Jabri 1990; Brigg et al. 2011) . It would need to engage across the local to global scales, mediating the inconsistencies and tensions that emerge through a broad epistemic community, both multi-vertical and multi-lateral. It would need to produce settlements acceptable for critical and mobile subjects. In other words, these 'impossible tasks' would demand forms of mediation aimed at global justice.
Hints of stage 3 mediation might be seen in the case of Northern Ireland. Here the role of a concert of mediators, from the US, UK, EU, back-door, formal, and across society, civil and others, began to develop an approach that was concerned with de-emphasising homogeneity, territory, and centralised sites of governance (Wolff 2004) . It aimed to resolve the range of identity, religious, territorial, and governance issues that had fed the conflict since the 1960s, as well as addressing longer standing issues stemming from British policy throughout the 20 th Century. Mediation on the part of a range of US, UK, formal and informal individuals and groups dismantled territorial sovereignty to a degree through system of governance shared between institutions in Belfast, Dublin, London, and Brussels, as well as a range of informal actors. This represented an attempt to accommodate sectarian difference, navigate around the problem of multiple claims over territory, competing governance systems, as well as material inequality (Powell 2008; Cox et al. 2006) . To date the Good
Friday Accords of 1998 are perhaps the most stable of the agreements so far examined, even though they have also been regularly challenged and the neoliberal economic framing that has more recently emerged has undermined them further. Mediation supported the accommodation of wide and competing claims and a less centralised, territorialised mode of governance, aimed at equalisation. This might be termed post-liberal: it bridged but did not challenge difference; it found ways of allowing but dampening territorialism and centralised government; and though capitalism was essential to it, more significant was the social and infrastructural parts of the agreement funded by vast UK and EU funds.
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After the discursive turn, and in the context of Bourdieuian notions of habitus, in a world where fixed categories are weakened, it is time to update 'international mediation' as praxis for an agonistic, multi-discursive world, of scales, relationships, mobility, networks, and justice demands across time and space. This world is hesitantly accepting the necessity of inclusivity and equality, or equa-liberty in the words of Balibar. Micro-solidarities, heterotopias, and a range of networked agencies are pushing in this direction (Massey 2007:184, 200; Escobar 2008:11-12; Balibar 2002; Michel 1984; Foucault 2002a; Foucault 2002b; Bhabha 1994) . Negotiation, mediation, translation, thus complement the production of a progressive and legitimate order.
Post-liberal mediation might be characterised in the following manner: it is a broad, bridging activity, involving a scalar range of actors, from the local to the global, from the informal to the formal, often working in teams. 
Conclusion
In the cases of Cyprus and the Middle East in the 1970s mediation focussed on power, status and territory. In the post-Cold War era intervention began to mediate the sovereign state and identity with the liberal peace, as in Bosnia Herzegovina where rights and democracy were central to the Dayton Accords. In the case of Northern Ireland, identity, territorial sovereignty, and the nature of governance also began to be mediated, leading to more complex, post-liberal and pluralist approaches. With the onset of more directly neoliberal forms of statebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan, territorial sovereignty began to be mediated by capital and new technologies of intervention along with revived counter-insurgency practices, leading to a reversion to a more securitised form of territorial sovereignty.
Mediation shifted away from war-endings and state reform as a consequence, and towards the maintenance of acceptable and profitable violence to a point where it did not directly threaten international order.
Thus, there appears to be four main stages through which to understand the evolution of mediation from a genealogical perspective. They span the narrow diplomatic function of mediating between warring parties to maintain the states-system to the broader, discursive and critical approach of mediating differences that cause direct or structural forms of violence through epistemological coalitions (Hass 1992) emerging in liberal and post-liberal approaches, and finally, the mediation of non-state claims, capital, technology and
